In this paper we study environments in which agents can transfer in uence to others by supporting them. When planning whom to support, they should take into account the future e ect of this, since the receiving agent might use this in uence to support others in the future. We show that in the presence of a ÿnite horizon there is an essentially unique optimal support behavior which can be characterized in terms of associated marginal value functions. The analysis of these marginal value functions allows us to derive qualitative properties of optimal support strategies under di erent speciÿc environments and to explicitly compute the optimal support behavior in some numerical examples. We also investigate the case of an inÿnite horizon. Examples show that multiple equilibria may appear in this setting, some of which sustaining a degree of cooperation that would not be possible under a ÿnite horizon.
Introduction
May it be in my interest to support rivals who can end up helping my friends? Can it be rational to refrain from supporting friends who might end up helping some of my rivals in the future? Questions of this type may arise in many situations where supporting an agent is likely to have important future consequences which I can no longer control once I supported him; the agent I did help to build up strength can use it later on to support others, regardless of my views about such action. Our aim in this paper is to provide a simple model where delay in supporting friends, or deliberate support of opponents can arise as the result of strategic considerations.
The transfer of in uence, and the concern for its future consequences, are present in a wide variety of social, economic and political environments. Consider, for instance, a department at a university in which members have preferences over colleagues. The in uence of each member depends on the support it gets from colleagues and everybody tries to organize his support in such a way as to help his friends as much as possible. This might lead to situations where members support less-preferred colleagues because they anticipate on the fact that these colleagues will support some of their friends. Or, conversely, do not support friends in fear of their future support behavior.
The same kind of reasoning applies to ÿrms that consider transferring technology to other ÿrms. Once the transfer has taken place, the receiving ÿrm might use the technology to transmit it to others in the future. Kotter (1979) stresses the importance of the indirect e ect of in uence in management, by saying that 'a manager can in uence someone indirectly by directly in uencing others who in turn have impact on that person'. Similar phenomena occur when studying the support between political parties in a country, or any other political situation where the political in uence depends on the support received from others.
A recent paper by BarberÂ a et al. (2000) has analyzed a similar phenomenon. Speciÿcally, they consider societies which admit new members by vote among those who are already in. Since newly elected members become future voters, agents in their model are also concerned with the future actions of potential entrants. There is, however, a fundamental di erence between our model and that of BarberÂ a et al. Once an agent is elected, he gets the full right to vote. If he is not elected, he has no right at all. Since it is assumed that one vote is enough to be elected, the fact whether my individual voting behavior makes a di erence on the ÿnal outcome depends heavily on the votes deposited by others. There is thus a basic discontinuity in the transfer of in uence from present voters to potential entrants. This discontinuity has a number of important consequences in reality, and it introduces a fundamental multiplicity of equilibria in the theoretical model. By contrast, our paper concentrates on those cases where the in uence gained by agents depends continuously on the support they get from others. Even if support is still modeled as a binary variable, acquired in uence grows as one gets supported by more, and more in uential people. In uence is here a simple variable, which summarizes possibly quite di erent and complex abilities of agents. Support is also a summary variable, standing for those social mechanisms which can be used to transfer in uence. Whenever our analysis can be used as an approximation, the reader will have to identify these elementary variables with some basic features of the phenomenon at hand. A priori, it is impossible to decide whether the impact of support on in uence is better modeled as a lump or continuous variable, and reality will always lie in between. We o er our model as a polar case, in which surprisingly simple characterizations of equilibrium behavior can be obtained, and the dynamics of support can be clearly understood.
We propose a stylized dynamic model in which forward looking agents consider the possibility of supporting others, knowing that their support will induce changes in the future distribution of in uence, and that they may not control the impact of their initial actions once these have contributed to strengthen other agents. We assume that the decision to support another agent, or not to, is binary; hence, we do not allow for intensities in the support of others.
The presence of every agent A induces (positive or negative) externalities for the other agents and it is assumed that the magnitude of the externality depends proportionally on A's in uence. If, for instance, agents A and B are 'friends', B derives a positive utility from A's presence and this utility grows if A becomes more in uential. On the other hand, if the e ect of A on B were negative, the e ect becomes worse if A's in uence grows.
The impact of support on the in uence distribution among agents is modeled as follows: the in uence of an agent increases proportionally to the total in uence of agents that support him. This re ects the idea that in uential agents have more impact than others since their contribution, when supporting, is more signiÿcant. The above-described relationship between in uence and support allows us to capture two key phenomena. First of all, supporting another agent produces the direct e ect of increasing his in uence and thereby a ecting your own utility (in a positive or negative sense). A second e ect is that the receiving agent may use his increase of in uence to support other agents in the future. As such, by supporting an agent, one implicitly transmits in uence to other agents, too.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces our model. Section 3 shows that the dynamic game, in which the agents plan their support behavior during a ÿnite number of stages, has an essentially unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Moreover, the equilibrium has an appealingly simple structure: the agents' support behavior at each stage is independent of the history up to that stage and is characterized by marginal value functions which can be computed via some recursive formula working backwards from the ÿnal stage. Roughly speaking, the marginal value functions re ect at each stage the future increase of utility that results from supporting a given agent. Put formally, the marginal value V t (Â; x) measures the future impact for agent Â of supporting agent x at stage t. The equilibrium states that agent Â should always support exactly those agents x having positive marginal value.
In Section 4, we introduce a model with a continuum of agents and propose a concept of equilibrium for this setting. The equilibria of the continuum are proven formally to provide good approximations for the equilibria of models with a ÿnite but large enough set of agents. This allows us to generate examples for the continuum case (which is computationally much more manageable), and yet be sure that they have approximate counterparts for ÿnite societies, which are indeed those for which our model and equilibrium concepts are more appropriate.
Section 5 is devoted to the analysis of speciÿc models exhibiting interesting dynamic features. We provide examples of societies where agents would systematically avoid to support enemies, and of other where they would transfer in uence to some of their enemies. Moreover, we can be very explicit about the features of our model which account for these phenomena.
In Section 6, we provide a su cient condition on the agents' preferences over others which guarantees that support behavior remains constant over time. Section 7 studies optimal support behavior in the presence of an inÿ-nite horizon. In contrast to the ÿnite horizon case, multiple subgame perfect equilibria may exist and equilibria need no longer be history independent. We conclude in Section 8.
The model and an example
Before presenting the formal model, we ÿrst lay out the intuition behind it. We consider a group of agents in which everybody produces externalities on the well-being of others. There are many di erent ways in which an agent Â can a ect the utility of others: agents can simply derive (positive or negative) utility from Â's presence or Â could take certain decisions which a ect the well-being of other agents. In this model, we abstract away from the underlying factors inducing these externalities and simply assume that an agent's utility depends on the presence of others. As such, these utilities should be viewed as the ÿnal result of some possibly complicated interaction process among agents.
A key factor in the model is the fact that the externality produced by agent Â on the utility of others is not exogenous but varies over time, depending on actions of other agents. More precisely, we assume that this externality (the intensity with which it a ects others) is proportional to some factor which we call the 'in uence' of Â. The word 'in uence' should thus be read as the impact that Â has on the utility of others.
We realize that in reality an agent's in uence depends on many di erent factors: too many to be captured within one model. Among these factors, we ÿlter an important one, namely the support an agent gets from other agents. Here, support should be read in a broad sense since it could take many forms, varying from ÿnancial or technological support between ÿrms to political support between parties. Important is that an agent's in uence changes over time due to the support it gets from others. On the other hand, this agent can use his in uence to support others in the future and thereby increase the in uence of other agents. It is this strong mutual relationship between supporting others on one hand and the in uence of agents on the other hand that is at the very heart of our model. Formally, the model is as follows.
The group of agents is given by a countable space = {Â 1 ; Â 2 ; : : :}. At stages t = 1; : : : ; T agents Â ∈ simultaneously choose to support a set S t (Â) ⊂ of agents. For the sake of convenience, it is assumed that an agent can support himself (i.e. S t (Â) may include Â). Remark 3 after Theorem 3.1 demonstrates that the analysis would not really change if it were assumed that agents can only support other agents.
In our context, support is modeled as a binary variable: one can either support an agent or not support him. We do not allow for di erent levels of support.
Before agents come into action there is an initial distribution of in uence among the agents which is given by a strictly positive measure 1 0 on . The support behavior of agents induces changes in the in uence distribution. We assume that the in uence of an agent increases proportionally to the total in uence of agents that support him in this stage. This means that supporting an agent will always contribute to his strength, and this contribution will be more signiÿcant if the supporting agent is more in uential. Formally, let t be the function representing the in uence distribution among agents at stage t. The evolution of in uence over time is given by the recursive equation
where is some strictly positive measure on . 2 Here, (Â) can be viewed as a measure for Â's sensitivity to support. If, for instance, (Â) is high, supporting Â contributes considerably to his in uence whereas a low (Â) allows only for a small increment of his in uence.
The utility for agent Â at stage t is given by
So, Â's utility depends linearly on the in uence of each agent x and the coe cient u(Â; x) can be interpreted as some normalized utility for agent Â induced by the presence of x. The function u : × → R generating these utility coe cients is called a utility proÿle. If u(Â; x) ¿ 0, then x's presence is good for Â and we say that x is a friend of Â. If u(Â; x) 6 0, agent x is called an enemy of Â. By comparing the magnitudes of u(Â; x), one can distinguish between big friends and small friends, big enemies and small enemies.
In particular, Â's utility increases if his friends become more in uential whereas his utility decreases if the in uence of enemies becomes larger. The overall utility for Â is equal to
where t are non-negative constants re ecting the relative contributions of stage utilities to the total utility. Canonical time separable utilities such as average utility and discounted utility can be modeled by choosing t = 1=T and t = t , respectively. After each stage, all agents observe the groups of agents S t (Â) supported by the others. A strategy for agent Â is to choose at every stage t a set S t (Â | h t ) of agents to be supported by him after any possible history h t at stage t. Here, a history h t is a sequence (S k (Â)) k 6 t−1; Â ∈ consisting of groups S k (Â) supported by agents at previous stages.
The quadruple = ( ; u; ; 0 ) consisting of the set of agents, the utility proÿle, the support sensitivity measure and the initial distribution of in uence, is called a society. The dynamic game induced by this society is denoted by ( ). In order to illustrate the di erent ingredients of our model, consider the following example.
Example 2.1. A department at a university has three research areas: A; B and C. During two consecutive years, the department will hire new scientists in these areas. At times t = 1; 2, the current members must decide about the number of people to be hired in each area. To this purpose, the department has agreed upon the following rule: each member can vote for (one or more) areas and the number of new positions in a given area is proportional to the number of votes this area gets, with proportionality coe cient 0:5. For sake of symmetry, assume that members belonging to the same area have identical preferences and will therefore vote identically. Each area Â ∈ {A; B; C} can therefore be regarded as an individual agent. Let t (Â) be the number of members working in area Â at period t and S t (Â) ⊂ {A; B; C} the set of areas voted for by Â at the beginning of time t. According to the voting rule
for t = 1; 2. 3 Here, 0 denotes the area conÿguration in the department before the voting procedure starts. Suppose, for instance, that the initial area conÿg-uration is given by 0 = (10; 5; 15), meaning that there are 10 area A people, 5 area B people and 15 area C people in the department before voting starts.
In this context, the numerical representation t (Â) of area Â at time t can be regarded as the 'in uence' of this area within the department. An area Â can transfer in uence to another area x (or, support x) by voting for x. The increase of x's in uence is proportional to the aggregate in uence of areas that support it.
Suppose that the utility for a member of area Â at time t is given by
where u(Â; x) re ect agent Â's preferences over the di erent areas. The (positive or negative) e ect of an area x on a member of area Â is thus proportional to the number of department members currently working in area x. Let the utilities u(Â; x) be given by the following matrix:
The aggregate utility for agent Â during the two periods is given by
The two-stage game deÿned above yields a unique subgame perfect voting behavior, given by the following This equilibrium behavior is independent of the initial distribution of areas 0 . Moreover, the behavior speciÿed at stage 2 is optimal for any combination of votes that ocurred at stage 1.
At the last stage, every area simply votes for its preferred areas (areas x giving positive utility u(Â; x)), since there are no future consequences which have to be taken into account. At the ÿrst stage, each area faces a tradeo between the immediate consequence of voting for an area (department hires new people in this area) and its future consequences (newly admitted members will have the right to vote at stage 2). For instance, area A will not vote for B (despite its positive direct e ect) at stage 1 since it knows that B will vote for C at stage 2, inducing a negative e ect which outrules the positive e ect at stage 1. On the other hand, C will vote for B at the ÿrst stage (despite the negative direct e ect) since it knows that B will vote for C at the next stage, compensating the negative e ect at the ÿrst stage.
Optimal support behavior
In the example above, we have seen that there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the two-stage game. In this section, we show that this is not a coincidence: every dynamic game induced by the model has an essentially unique subgame perfect equilibrium. By 'essentially unique', we mean that it is unique up to ties occurring when an agent Â is indi erent between supporting another agent x or not. Moreover, the subgame perfect equilibrium has a very simple structure. First of all, the support behavior at every stage is history independent, hence an agent need not keep track of all the groups that have been supported at previous stages. Another property is that the equilibrium behavior does not depend on the initial in uence distribution. Finally, the equilibrium is characterized by a sequence of the so-called 'marginal value functions' (one for every stage) which can be computed recursively, starting at the ÿnal stage. Intuitively, a marginal value function at a given stage assigns to every pair (Â; x) a measure for the future increase in Â's utility which results from supporting x at this stage. The equilibrium states that at every stage agent Â should exactly support those agents x that have positive value.
In order to make our statement precise, we need some more deÿnitions. A strategy proÿle S (prescribing a strategy for each agent) is called a subgame perfect equilibrium if at any stage t and after any history h t , the group of agents S t (Â | h t ) supported by agent Â maximizes Â's continuation payo , given the behavior of other agents at this stage and the behavior of all agents at future stages.
In general, there may exist multiple subgame perfect equilibria. However, multiplicity is solely due to the fact that at some points in the game an agent Â is indi erent between supporting another agent x and not supporting him. In this case, both supporting x and not supporting x can be part of a subgame perfect equilibrium. In order to eliminate such multiplicity, we introduce a tie breaking rule which states that in case of indi erence, the agent x should be supported. Hence, the agent should always support the largest group that maximizes his continuation payo . Subgame perfect equilibria satisfying this tie breaking rule are called maximal subgame perfect equilibria.
The tie breaking rule is rather arbitrary. One could also require that in case of indi erence, the agent x should not be supported. In Remark 2 after Theorem 3.1, we show how optimal support behavior could be characterized for this alternative tie breaking rule.
Using the ÿrst tie breaking rule, we show that there is a unique maximal subgame perfect equilibrium which is given by a sequence of the so-called 'marginal value functions'. For every stage t, let the marginal value function V t : × → R be given by the recursive formula
for all t¡T . In equilibrium, agent Â at stage t supports exactly those agents x for which V t (Â; x) ¿ 0.
Theorem 3.1. For every society ; the game ( ) contains a unique maximal subgame perfect equilibrium; which is the history independent strategy proÿle S given by
for all t; h t and Â.
Before stating the proof of this result, we make a few remarks. Remark 1. Marginal value functions versus 'real' value functions. Let us ÿrst discuss the role of the marginal value functions, which are key in determining the agents' equilibrium behavior. First of all, it is important to stress that these marginal value functions are di erent from the 'real' value functions used in dynamic programming. A 'real' value function for agent Â should specify at every stage and for every possible action available to agent Â at this stage the future utility he would obtain by choosing this action, given the equilibrium behavior at future stages. In the present context, an action for agent Â at stage t corresponds to choosing a subset S t (Â) of agents he wants to support. From Eq. (3:4) in the proof of Theorem 3.1, it follows that the value for agent Â of supporting the set of agents S t (Â) at stage t is equal tõ
where C is a term which does not depend on Â's behavior. This equation thus establishes the relationship between the 'real' value functions and the marginal value functions in this particular context. From the equation above it is easily seen that agent Â's maximization problem at stage t, namely choosing the set S t (Â) which maximizes his value (using our tie breaking rule), is solved by supporting those agents x with V t (Â; x) ¿ 0. Hence, keeping track of the marginal value functions is su cient to solve the dynamic programming problem faced by the agents in this game. Since the marginal value functions are easier to handle than the real value functions, we use the former to compute the equilibrium behavior. Another reason for using these marginal value functions instead of the real value functions is that the former re ect directly the di erence between 'liking an agent x' (that is, attach positive utility u(Â; x) to agent x), and the 'willingness to support agent x at a given stage', re ected by the marginal value V t (Â; x) at this stage.
The recursive equation for the marginal value functions can be seen as a multi-agent variant of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation in dynamic programming. It states that the marginal value V t (Â; x) for Â of supporting x at stage t can be decomposed into an immediate e ect t u(Â; x) and a future e ect, given by the last two terms. The future e ect consists of the corresponding marginal value V t+1 (Â; x) at the next stage and an interaction e ect represented by the sum. The interaction e ect describes the consequences for Â of having x support other agents in the future: an e ect which does not occur in 'standard' one-agent dynamic programming.
The use of value functions in dynamic one-person decision problems is widely spread (see Streufert, 1990; Kreps and Porteus, 1979 ; among many others). Applications of value functions to dynamic games can be found, for instance, in Ba sar and Olsder (1995), Theorem 6:6 and Gomes et al. (1999) .
Remark 2. On the choice of the tie breaking rule. Theorem 3.1, together with the recursive equation for the marginal value functions, characterize the optimal support behavior under a speciÿc tie breaking rule which states that an agent should always support the largest group of agents that maximizes his continuation payo . As we have mentioned earlier on in this section, one could use an alternative tie breaking rule which states that an agent should always support the smallest group of agents that maximize his continuation payo . That is, if an agent Â is indi erent between supporting agent x or not supporting him, Â should not support x.
Theorem 3.1 and the recursive equation for the marginal value functions can be easily adapted to this new tie breaking rule. The new marginal value functions are characterized by
whereas the unique optimal support behavior would be given by the strategy proÿle S satisfying
at every stage t. In particular, uniqueness of optimal behavior is guaranteed also under this alternative tie breaking rule.
The following example shows that the two tie breaking rules will induce di erent equilibrium behavior in general. Consider a society with three agents, A; B and C, and two periods. Let the utilities u(Â; x) be given by the following table:
Suppose that (Â) = 1 for all Â ∈ {A; B; C}, the initial in uence distribution is given by 0 = (1; 1; 1) and that t = 1 for t = 1; 2. The reader may check that under the ÿrst tie breaking rule (in which an agent supports another agent in case of indi erence), the agents' equilibrium behavior is as follows: The induced in uence distributions at periods 1 and 2 are 1 = (4; 4; 4) and 2 = (8; 16; 16) respectively, whereas the overall utilities for the agents are given by U (A) = 12 and U (B) = U (C) = 68.
Under the second tie breaking rule (in which an agent does not support another agent in case of indi erence) the agents act according to the table below.
The in uence distributions are given by 1 = (2; 3; 3) and 2 = (4; 9; 9), respectively, and the utilities received by the agents correspond to U (A) = 6 and U (B) = U (C) = 42.
Remark 3. If agents cannot support themselves. In some cases it would be reasonable to assume that an agent's in uence can only depend on the support received from others. A possible way to adapt our model to this phenomenon is to restrict the strategy spaces of the agents by allowing them only to support other agents. That is, at every stage t the set of agents S t (Â) supported by Â cannot contain Â. Again, the marginal value functions and Theorem 3.1 can be adapted to this modiÿcation. The recursive equation characterizing the value functions would be
and
whereas the optimal support behavior would be given by the strategy proÿle S where
for every stage t.
Remark 4. On the time independence of . As an extension of the present model we could allow the parameter (Â), re ecting agent Â's sensitivity to support, to depend on the stage t, for instance to re ect the phenomenon that past in uence would vanish with the passage of time. In this case, denote by (Â; t) the value of (Â) at stage t. The marginal value functions in this new situation would be given by
whereas Theorem 3.1 would remain unchanged.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let S be a strategy proÿle. We show by induction on t that the unique maximal subgame perfect behavior at stage t is given by
We start at the ÿnal stage T . Let h T be an arbitrary but ÿxed history up to stage T and let Â be an agent. Independently of the other agents' behavior at this stage, it is optimal for Â to support all those agents x with T u(Â; x)¿0 and not to support any agent x with T u(Â; x)¡0. Maximality requires Â to support all those agents with u(Â; x) = 0 and therefore it follows that
Since this holds for any history h T and any agent Â the statement is true at the ÿnal stage. Now, let ¡T and let S t (Â) = {x | V t (Â; x) ¿ 0} be the unique maximal subgame perfect support behavior at stage t for all t ¿ and all histories h t . Let h be an arbitrary but ÿxed history at the beginning of stage . First, we need some deÿnitions and technical observations. For all t ¿ ; let the functions s t : × → {0; 1} be deÿned by
0 otherwise: Let t ; t ¿ , be the unique in uence distribution at stage t, given that we start with history h at stage and given that agents act according to S 2064 S. BarberÂ a, A. Perea / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 26 (2002 ) 2051 -2092 at future stages. The evolution of t is given by
For a measure on and a function f : × → R let the measure f on be given by
for all x. Hence, by deÿnition,
where I is the identity operator on measures. Let f; g : × → R. We deÿne the functionfg :
Lemma 3.2. Let f; g : × → R and a measure on . Then; it holds that
The proof of this lemma can be found in the appendix. Let U t (Â) = x u(Â; x) t (x) be the utility for agent Â at stage t generated by h and the strategy proÿle S.
Lemma 3.3. For every t ¿ it holds that
Here, by t l = (I +s l )u we mean the function obtained from u by succesively applying the operators (I +s ); (I +s +1 ); : : : ; (I +s t ).
The proof of this lemma can be found in the appendix.
Let the function w : × → R be given by
(I +s l )u (Â; x):
By deÿnition ofs w we have
Since, by the induction assumption, S is history independent at stages t ¿ ; it follows that
do not depend on S (Â): Combining Eqs. (2) and (3) leads therefore to the following conclusion.
Lemma 3.4. At stage it holds that
where C is an expression that does not depend on S (Â).
It can be checked immediately that the functions w t : × → R (for t ¿ ) are given by the following recursive formula: w T (Â; x) = T u(Â; x) and
By deÿnitioñ
using the induction assumption that S t+1 (x) = {y | V t+1 (x; y) ¿ 0}: Hence,
for all t ¿ : This means that the functions w t ; t ¿ , are given by the same recursive formula as the marginal value functions V t ; t ¿ : However, this implies that w t (Â; x) = V t (Â; x) for all t ¿ . Combining this result with Lemma 3.4 leads to the observation that the continuation payo is equal to
where C is an expression which does not depend on S (Â): Since 0 (Â)¿0 and t is non-decreasing over time, we have −1 (Â)¿0: As such, maximizing the continuation payo at stage is a matter of choosing S (Â) such that
is maximal. Since S is assumed to be a maximal subgame perfect equilibrium,
This completes the proof of the theorem.
Limit behavior in continuum societies
One of the aims of this paper is to illustrate the phenomenon of postponement or advancement of support for speciÿc classes of problems, as a means to understand what features in the preferences of agents are crucial in generating di erent types of behavior. Yet, ÿnding numerical examples, or interesting classes of parametrized problems, is not an easy task. This task could be facilitated if we could work with continuous variables; that is, if we had a model with a continuum of agents over which other agents could then have preferences, representable by continuous utility functions. The use of models with a continuum of agents has a long tradition in economics and political science (see, for instance, Schmeidler (1973) ; Aumann (1964) among many others) and we would not elaborate much on it, were it is not that, in our case, a simple extrapolation of concepts without some further interpretation could be misleading. We shall work, indeed, with a continuum of agents, each of which will have mass zero. Hence, as in standard models, changes in the support behavior of a single agent will have no in uence at all on the overall outcome. Moreover, and this is a crucial di erence with, say, Aumann's (1964) model of a competitive economy, any individual in the continuum society will be indi erent among all types of support behavior that are available to him. This follows from the fact that support is the agent's only choice variable, and yet it does a ect his utility. (This in contrast with a consumer's behavior in the continuum; he cannot a ect prices, but still derives di erent utilities from di erent consumption plans.)
Because of that, our model of a continuum society is no longer a game in any proper sense, and equilibria for this model can hardly be justiÿed per se. Instead, we use a continuum society as an approximation of large discrete societies, and equilibrium behavior is deÿned in terms of the discrete societies approximating the continuum. As we shall see, both the model and the equilibrium notion proposed will prove to be useful and to provide a well grounded method to construct examples which have direct bearing for the understanding of discrete societies. To do that, we now discuss the model, the equilibrium concept, and their relationships with large discrete societies.
Limit equilibria
Before stating the formal deÿnition of our equilibrium concept, let us brie y sketch the idea. Our starting point is a society with a continuum set of agents : For every n ∈ N we select a discrete set n of representatives from such that n becomes dense in . To every n ; there corresponds a discrete society n obtained by taking the 'projection' of on n : A strategy proÿle S in the continuum society is called a limit equilibrium if the sequence S n of (unique) maximal subgame perfect equilibria in the discrete games ( n ) converges to S: In order to formalize the idea of approximating a continuum society by a sequence of discrete societies, we need the following deÿnitions. Let = ( ; u; ; 0 ) be a continuum society where (a) is a non-atomic separable metric space, (b) u : × → R is continuous and (c) and 0 are strictly positive measures on .
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A discrete grid on is a pair (ˆ ; P) whereˆ = {Â 1 ; Â 2 ; : : :} is a discrete subset of and P = {P 1 ; P 2 ; : : :} is a partition of such that Â k ∈ P k and P k contains a non-empty open subset for all k. The grid induces a discrete societyˆ = (ˆ ;û;ˆ ;ˆ 0 ) where (a) the set of agents isˆ ; (b) the utility proÿleû :ˆ ×ˆ → R is the restriction of u onˆ ×ˆ ; (c)ˆ is the measure onˆ given byˆ (Â k ) = (P k ) for all Â k ∈ˆ and (d)ˆ 0 is the measure on withˆ 0 (Â k ) = 0 (P k ) for all Â k ∈ˆ : 6 The discrete societyˆ is called the discrete projection of induced by the grid (ˆ ; P): We writeˆ = (ˆ ; P):
For a given discrete grid (ˆ ; P); let u : × → R be the step function induced by u and (ˆ ; P); given by
if Â ∈ P k and x ∈ P l : Hence, u is the unique function on × which coincides with u onˆ ×ˆ and is constant on the induced partition elements of × : Let be a continuum society and n = ( n ; P n ) a sequence of discrete projections with corresponding step functions u n : We say that n converges to if (a)
n ⊂ n+1 for all n; (b) ∪ n n is dense in and (c) u n converges uniformly to u.
Let
n be a sequence of discrete projections converging to the continuum society and let S n be the unique maximal subgame perfect equilibrium in ( n ). It remains to deÿne the limit behavior in induced by the sequence S n : A history independent 8 strategy proÿle in the continuum society is a proÿle S = (S t (Â)) t 6 T; Â ∈ where S t (Â) ⊂ for all t and Â: The limit behavior induced by S n is deÿned as the history independent strategy proÿle lim inf S n in given by
and lim
5 A measure on a metric space is called strictly positive if it assigns strictly positive mass to each non-empty, open subset. 6 The measuresˆ andˆ 0 are strictly positive since and 0 are assumed to be strictly positive measures on and all partition elements in P contain non-empty open subsets. 7 A sequence of functions fn : A → R is said to converge uniformly to f : A → R if for every ¿0 there exists an N ∈ N such that |f(x) − fn(x)|¡ for all n ¿ N and all x ∈ A:
8 We know, by Theorem 3.1, that the maximal subgame perfect equilibria S n are all history independent. Since we want to deÿne the limit behavior induced by S n in ; it su ces to restrict attention to history independent strategy proÿles in .
Intuitively, it means that Â supports x in lim inf S n if we can ÿnd representatives Â n and x n arbitrarily close to Â and x such that x n is supported by Â n in some of the approximating equilibria. The deÿnition of lim inf S n t (Â) is very close to the deÿnition of the inner limit of a sequence of subsets of a metric space, as used in Dantzig et al. (1967) . 9 Now, we have all the ingredients to deÿne limit equilibria. A history independent strategy proÿle S in the continuum society is called a limit equilibrium if there is a sequence n of discrete projections converging to and a sequence S n of maximal subgame perfect equilibria in ( n ) such that S is almost equal to lim inf S n : Here, two strategies proÿles S and S in are said to be almost equal if for every t and Â the di erence between the sets S t (Â) and S t (Â) has -measure zero.
Almost uniqueness and characterization
In our theorem below, we prove the existence of a special limit equilibrium S and show that every limit equilibrium is almost equal to S. The special limit equilibrium S is characterized by marginal value functions V t : × → R given by the recursive formula
for all t¡T: Hence, the marginal value functions V t are the continuum analogues of the marginal value functions in discrete societies.
In order to obtain our result, we impose two weak regularity conditions on the continuum society which are called the boundedness condition and the indi erence condition. The society is said to satisfy the boundedness condition if there is a number a¡0 and a number M ¿0 such that ({x ∈ | V t (Â; x) ¿ a}) 6 M for all t and Â: We say that the game satisÿes the indi erence condition if ({x ∈ | V t (Â; x) = 0}) = 0 is satisÿed for all t and Â.
10 In words, this means that the group of agents x for which Â is indi erent always is neglectably small. Theorem 4.1. Let be a continuum society satisfying the boundedness condition and the indi erence condition. Let S be the history independent strategy proÿle in given by
for all t and Â: Then; S is a limit equilibrium and every limit equilibrium is almost equal to S.
Proof. Let
n be a sequence of discrete projections converging to ; induced by the discrete grids ( n ; P n ): Let S n be the corresponding sequence of maximal subgame perfect equilibria. We deÿne the history independent strategy proÿle S in by S = lim inf S n : We proceed in three steps. First, we prove that the corresponding sequence of marginal value functions V n t of the discrete approximating societies converges to the marginal value function V t in . Secondly, it is shown that S is almost equal to the strategy proÿle S deÿned in the theorem, implying that S is a limit equilibrium. Finally, we prove that every limit equilibrium is almost equal to S.
Step 1: Convergence of discrete marginal value functions to continuum marginal value functions. Let n be the discrete projection generated by the discrete grid ( n ; P n ): For every n and every t let V n t :
n × n → R be the marginal value function at stage t in the discrete society n ; as deÿned in the previous section: We deÿne the step functions V n t : × → R by V n t (Â; x) = V n t (Â k ; x l ); where Â k ; x l ∈ n are in the same P n -partition element as Â and x, respectively.
Lemma 4.2. For every t; the sequence of functions V n t converges uniformly to V t :
Proof. We proceed by induction on t. For every n let u n : × → R be the step function generated by u and ( n ; P n ); as deÿned above: Since n converges to ; the sequence u n converges uniformly to u; by deÿnition. If t = T; then V n T = T u n and hence V n T = T u n : Using the fact that u n converges uniformly to u and V T = T u leads to the conclusion that V n T converges uniformly to V T :
Now, let t¡T: Let n be ÿxed, (Â; x) an arbitrary point in × and (Â k ; x l ) ∈ n × n such that Â and x are in the same P n -partition set as Â k and x l , respectively. Let u n be the utility proÿle and n the support sensitivity measure in n : Then, by deÿnition
Since n is the 'contraction' of on n induced by P n and V n t+1 is the step function on × which is constant on P n -partition elements and coincides with V n t+1 on n × n ; it follows that In the last equation, we used the deÿnitions of u n and V n t+1 : Using the recursive formula for V t we have
where
By combining Eqs. (6) and (7) we obtain that
Let ¿0 be given. We show that there is an N such that | V n t (Â; x)−V t (Â; x)|¡ for all n ¿ N and all (Â; x) in × :
Let the three terms on the right-hand side of (8) be denoted by A n (Â; x); B n (Â; x) and C n (Â; x): Since u n converges uniformly to u we can ÿnd N 1 ∈ N such that A n (Â; x)¡ =3 for all n ¿ N 1 and all (Â; x): Using the induction assumption that V n t+1 converges uniformly to V t+1 it follows that there is an N 2 such that B n (Â; x)¡ =3 for all n ¿ N 2 and all (Â; x): It remains to show that we can ÿnd N 3 such that C n (Â; x)¡ =3 for all n ¿ N 3 and all (Â; x):
By the boundedness condition, there is a¡0 and an M ¿0 such that ({x | V t+1 (Â; x) ¿ a}) 6 M for all Â: Choose b¿0 such that b¡min{ = 27M; −a}: Then the term C n (Â; x) can be written as the sum
Let the three terms on the right-hand side be denoted by C n 1 (Â; x); C n 2 (Â; x) and C n 3 (Â; x), respectively. We show that for i = 1; 2; 3; the term C n i (Â; x)¡ =9 for all (Â; x) if n is large enough.
We start with C n 1 (Â; x): Since V n t+1 converges uniformly to V t+1 , there exists N 3 such that | V n t+1 (x; y) − V t+1 (x; y)|¡b=2 for all n ¿ N 3 and all (x; y): Since we integrate only over y's with V t+1 (x; y) 6 −b; it follows that V n t+1 (x; y)¡0 for all y's over which we integrate. This implies that s n t+1 (x; y) = s t+1 (x; y) = 0 for all y in the integral and hence C n 1 (Â; x) = 0 for all n ¿ N 3 and all (Â; x):
The term C Since, by assumption, b¡ − a (we refer to the constant a¡0 of the boundedness condition), we have that −b¿a and therefore {y | − b¡V t+1 (x; y)¡b} ⊂ {y | V t+1 (x; y) ¿ a} and hence, for all n ¿ N 4 and all (Â; x); C n 2 (Â; x) 6 3b · ({y | V t+1 (x; y) ¿ a}) 6 3b · M by the boundedness condition. Since, by assumption, b¡ =27M it follows that C n 2 (Â; x)¡ =9 for all n ¿ N 4 and all (Â; x):
Let c¿0 be such that c¡min{b=2; =9M }: Since V n t+1 converges uniformly to V t+1 ; we can ÿnd N 5 such that | V n t+1 (x; y) − V t+1 (x; y)|¡c for all n ¿ N 5 and all (x; y): Then, since c 6 b=2; V t+1 n (x; y)¿0 for all y over which we integrate if n ¿ N 5 : Hence, for all n ¿ N 5 ; s n t+1 (x; y) = s t+1 (x; y) = 1 for all y over which we integrate. Therefore, for all n ¿ N 5 and all (Â; x);
Now, let N = max{N 1 ; : : : ; N 5 }: Then, for all n ¿ N and all (Â; x) we have that
This completes the proof of the lemma.
This lemma implies that the marginal value functions V n t :
n × n → R converge pointwise to V t : × → R: Stated formally, we obtain the following result.
Lemma 4.3. If the sequence (Â
Proof. For all n we have that
Let ¿0 be given. Since V n t converges uniformly to V t and V t is continuous, there is N such that | V n t (Â n ;
Step 2: S is a limit equilibrium. By Theorem 3.1, we know that ( n ) has a unique maximal subgame perfect equilibrium S n characterized by the marginal value functions V n t : Hence, by deÿnition, S = lim inf S n ; where S n is given by
for all t and all Â n ∈ n : Now, we show that S is almost equal to the strategy proÿle S in given by
for all t and all Â ∈ :
Let t and Â ∈ be given. First, we prove that S t (Â) ⊂ S t (Â): Let x ∈ S t (Â): Since S = lim inf S n ; there is a sequence (Â n ; x n ) ∈ n × n converging to (Â; x) such that x n ∈ S n t (Â n ) for all n. Hence, V n t (Â n ; x n ) ¿ 0 for all n. Since V n t converges pointwise to V t it follows that V t (Â; x) ¿ 0 and hence x ∈ S t (Â): Now, we show that S t (Â) \ S t (Â) has -measure zero. Let x ∈ S t (Â); hence V t (Â; x) ¿ 0:
Suppose that V t (Â; x)¿0: Then, since V n t converges pointwise to V t ; there is a sequence (Â n ; x n ) ∈ n × n converging to (Â; x) such that V n t (Â n ; x n )¿0 for all n. Hence, x n ∈ S n t (Â n ) for all n which implies that x ∈ lim inf S n = S: Therefore, S t (Â) \ S t (Â) ⊂ {x ∈ | V t (Â; x) = 0}: But, by the indi erence condition, ({x ∈ | V t (Â; x) = 0}) = 0; which implies that S t (Â) \ S t (Â) has -measure zero. Given this fact, we may conclude that S t (Â) is almost equal to S t (Â) for all t and all Â: This completes the proof of the fact that S is a limit equilibrium.
Step 3: Every limit equilibrium is almost equal to S. Let S be an arbitrary limit equilibrium. Then, by deÿnition, there is a sequence n of discrete projections converging to and a sequence S n of corresponding maximal subgame perfect equilibria such that S is almost equal to lim inf S n : In part (a) of the proof, we have shown that the special limit equilibrium S is almost equal to lim inf S n ; irrespective of the approximating sequence n we choose. As a consequence, S is almost equal to S; which completes the proof of the theorem.
Single peaked preferences on the real line
In this section, we apply the characterization of optimal support behavior in continuum societies, as presented in the previous section. Although we provide examples of continuum models, the reader should bear in mind that the qualitative features stressed in the examples will be shared by models of ÿnite but large enough societies along the sequences converging to the limiting examples.
We focus on a group of agents which is represented by the real line. 11 A possible interpretation is that agents are ordered according to some parameter which can be viewed as the agent's type. Agents which are close to each other on the line are similar whereas agents separated by a large distance are very di erent. In many situations, agents prefer types similar to their own. This can be modeled by single peaked preferences: for each agent Â; the individual utility function u(Â; ·) : R → R has a maximum at Â and utility decreases if the agent's type is further away from Â:
As will become clear in the sections to come, the agents' support behavior depends crucially on the shape of the individual utility curves. It is important to know how utility changes if we move further away from the most preferred type. One possibility is that utility decreases faster if we are further away from the peak, meaning that individual utility functions are concave. This re ects situations where agents have strong preferences for similar types and strong 'objections' against very di erent types. This section is devoted to this particular class of preferences. We show that, under some symmetry conditions deÿned below, concave preferences induce support behavior in which agents always support subsets of their friends. Recall that an agent x is called Â's friend if u(Â; x) ¿ 0: Agents with concave preferences have therefore no incentives to support members with negative utility since this would lead to a decrease of their future utility. Before deriving the result, we specify the setting and introduce the symmetry assumptions.
Consider the continuum society = R: We assume that is the Lebesguemeasure on R. Instead of d (y) we write dy. We say that the utility proÿle u : × → R is strictly concave if the individual utility functions u(Â; ·) : R → R are strictly concave for all Â: The utility proÿle u is called anonymous if u(Â; x) = u(Â + a; x + a) for all Â; x; a: In words, this means that every agent has the same utility function, up to translation. We say that u is diagonally symmetric if u(Â; Â + a) = u(Â; Â − a) for all Â; a: Note that strict concavity and diagonal symmetry imply that u(Â; ·) has a single peak at Â.
Theorem 5.1. Let u be strictly concave; anonymous and diagonally symmetric and let T ¿0: Then; the limit equilibrium S of Theorem 4:1 is the almost unique limit equilibrium and S is such that agents will always support a subset of their friends. If; moreover; t = 0 for all t¡T; then the group S t (Â) of agents supported by Â increases monotonically over time for every Â:
Our conjecture is that monotonicity of support also holds if t ¿0 for t¡T . However, we did not manage to ÿnd a proof yet.
The proof of this theorem can be found in the appendix. The theorem above states that agents with concave, anonymous and diagonally symmetric preferences have no incentives to support enemies. The recursive formula for the marginal value functions V t has been applied to derive this qualitative result. In the remainder of this section, we exploit this recursive formula to explicitly compute the support behavior for two special classes of concave preferences, namely quadratic and exponential preferences. It turns out that in both cases the group supported by a particular agent increases monotonically over time: a result which strengthens our conjecture stated directly after the theorem. Moreover, the group supported by Â increases faster as time evolves.
Next, we turn to normal preferences as an example of non-concave preferences. In contrast to the previous results, now agents will support enemies at all but the last stage and the group supported by an agent decreases monotonically over time.
Throughout the remainder of this section, we assume that is the real line, t = 1 for all t and is the Lebesgue measure.
Quadratic preferences
Assume that the utility proÿle u is given by
Hence, u(Â; ·) has a maximum at Â and roots at Â − 1 and Â + 1: Obviously, u is strictly concave, anonymous and diagonally symmetric and Theorem 5.1 assures that there is an almost unique limit equilibrium S in which agents will never support enemies. Using the recursive formula for the marginal value functions, we are able to prove that all marginal value functions are quadratic functions of the form
where the coe cients a t ; b t are given by the recursive equation
Here, the coe cients a t and b t do not depend on Â:
In the limit equilibrium S agent Â supports the interval [Â − b t ; Â + b t ] at stage t: Hence, determining the limit equilibrium S is simply a matter of computing the parameters b t given by the recursive formula (9). Exploiting the formula, it can be shown that b t is strictly increasing over time and hence the group of agents supported by Â monotonically increases over time for all Â. If the number of stages T is large and t is small
The last property follows from formula (9) and the observation that a t tends to inÿnity if T − t is very large. It implies that b t tends to zero if T − t is very large. Intuitively, this means that if many stages are involved, agents support only very small groups at the beginning. The following Fig. 1 shows the evolution of b t in a game with 15 stages. 
Exponential preferences
Assume that the utility proÿle u has the form
The function u(Â; ·) has a maximum at Â and roots at Â − 1 and Â + 1: Again, u is concave, anonymous and diagonally symmetric and hence Theorem 5.1 applies. Using the recursive formula for the marginal value functions, it can be shown that all marginal value functions are exponential functions of the form
where a t and b t are parameters which do not depend on Â: The limit equilibrium S is such that at every stage t agent Â supports S t (Â) = [Â − c t ; Â + c t ] with c t being independent of Â: The numbers a t ; b t and c t are given by the recursive equation a T = e + 1 e ; b T = 1; c T = 1; a t = e + 1 e + a t+1 + 2a t+1 c t+1 ;
Computing the limit equilibrium S is therefore equivalent to calculating the parameters c t given by the recursive formula above. The following Fig. 2 shows the evolution of c t over time in a game with 15 stages. Similar to the case with quadratic preferences, the group supported by agent Â strictly increases over time and the rate of increase grows as time evolves.
Normal preferences
The function u(Â; ·) has a maximum at Â and roots at Â − 1 and Â + 1: Hence, u is diagonally symmetric and anonymous but not concave. Unfortunately, the marginal value functions V t cannot be written in the form
and can therefore not be parametrized as has been the case with quadratic and exponential preferences. This complicates our attempt to undertake simulations with many stages, since the computer package has to calculate the complete marginal value function at each stage. A simulation with four stages shows that the curves of the individual marginal value functions V t (Â; ·) are very close to normal. Fig. 3 show the curves of V t (0; ·) at stages 1; 2 and 3, respectively. Since u is diagonally symmetric and anonymous, the proof of Theorem 5.1 assures that the marginal value function V t is anonymous and therefore every individual marginal value function V t (Â; ·) is equal to V t (0; ·) after translation. Since the boundedness condition and the indi erence condition are clearly satisÿed, the marginal value functions characterize an almost unique limit equilibrium S. As can be seen in the ÿgure, the group supported by agent Â in S contains enemies at all but the last stage and decreases over time. More exactly, the limit equilibrium is such that agent Â at stage t supports the set S t (Â) = [Â − a t ; Â + a t ] where a t does not depend on Â and is given by the following 
Stationary support
In Section 5 we have seen that quadratic and exponential preferences lead to increasing support over time, whereas normal preferences induce decreasing support as time evolves. These results raise the question whether we can ÿnd circumstances under which support remains constant over time. In this section we provide a su cient condition for stationary support behavior and illustrate the result with an example.
A utility proÿle u in a continuum society is said to induce stationary support if the limit equilibrium S (by which we mean the limit equilibrium in Theorem 4.1) is such that for every Â the set S t (Â) remains constant over time. In the theorem we present a su cient condition on u to induce stationary support. To this purpose, we deÿne the operator A transforming a function f : × → R into the function Af : × → R given by Theorem 6.1. Let t ¿0 for all t and let the utility proÿle u be such that Au = u for some constant ¿0: Then; u induces stationary support.
Proof. Let u be such that Au = u for some constant ¿0: Let S be the limit equilibrium and V t the corresponding marginal value functions. By deÿnition, we have V T = T u and V t = t u + V t+1 + AV t+1 for all t¡T: In particular,
By induction, it follows that V t is always a strictly positive multiple of u: Consequently, S t (Â) = {x | V t (Â; x) ¿ 0} = {x | u(Â; x) ¿ 0} for all t which means that u induces stationary support. 
Hence, Au = 1= u and Theorem 6.1 assures that u induces stationary support.
In the case where is the real line; we did not yet manage to ÿnd an interesting utility proÿle u which induces stationary support. Trivial but unappealing utility proÿles that induce stationary support are, for instance, those in which each agent Â dislikes all other agents (i.e. u(Â; x)¡0 for all x). In this case, Â will always support nobody. An open question is still whether there exists a utility proÿle u : R×R → R inducing stationary support and satisfying the following properties: (a) u is anonymous and diagonally symmetric, (b) u(Â; ·) is positive at [Â − a; Â + a] and negative outside for some a¿0:
Inÿnite horizon
Up to this point, we assumed that agents face a ÿnite horizon, which is commonly known to all. In some cases, however, this assumption may not be appropriate. It is therefore worthwhile analyzing the case of an inÿnite (or uncertain) horizon. As will be shown in this section, the introduction of an inÿnite horizon induces a remarkable change in optimal support behavior: a phenomenon which is not surprising, given the important di erence between a ÿnite and an inÿnite horizon in the literature on repeated games. In general, uniqueness of subgame perfect equilibrium is lost when facing an inÿnite horizon and history dependent equilibria may arise. Before turning to history dependent equilibria, we ÿrst analyze the class of history independent equilibria.
History independent equilibria
It turns out that, even when concentrating on history independent equilibria, the situation drastically changes when switching to an inÿnite horizon. As we will see, multiple history independent equilibria, and even multiple stationary equilibria may exist. Similar to the ÿnite horizon case, they can be characterized by marginal value functions.
In the sequel, we solely concentrate on discrete societies but similar arguments would hold when considering continuum societies. First, we try to characterize maximal subgame perfect equilibria with inÿnite horizon by using marginal value functions. Consider a history independent maximal subgame perfect equilibrium S for the ÿnite horizon case, so S = (S t (Â)) t 6 T; Â ∈ : In the proof of Theorem 3.1, we have seen that the marginal value functions V t are given by
where the operators l transforms a function f : × → R into a functioñ s l f : × → R given bỹ
Now, let S be a history independent strategy proÿle for the inÿnite horizon case, so S = (S t (Â)) t ∈ N; Â ∈ : In the same way as above, we may deÿne the marginal value functions V t ; t ∈ N; induced by S by
given that this expression exists. By essentially copying the proof of Theorem 3.1 we obtain the following characterization of history independent equilibria with inÿnite horizon.
Theorem 7.1. Let S be a history independent strategy proÿle for the inÿ-nite horizon case. Suppose that S is such that the marginal value functions (V t ) t ∈ N induced by S exist. Then; S is a maximal subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if S t (Â) = {x | V t (Â; x) ¿ 0} for all t:
A disadvantage, in comparison with the ÿnite horizon case, is that the marginal value functions can no longer be computed recursively by backward induction, since there is no longer a ÿnal stage. Determining the marginal value functions and verifying the condition of the theorem above can therefore become a complicated matter.
The theorem can be used, however, to provide a su cient condition for stationary equilibria, similar to the one presented in Theorem 6.1 for a ÿnite horizon. Let A be the operator transforming a utility proÿle u : × → R into a new function Au : × → R given by Au(Â; x) = y:u(x;y) ¿ 0 u(Â; y) (y):
Theorem 7.2. Let Au = u for some number ¿0: Then; the stationary strategy proÿle S in which at every stage; after any history; agent Â supports S(Â) = {x | u(Â; x) ¿ 0} is a maximal subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that Au = u for some ¿0: Let the stationary strategy proÿle S be given by S t (Â) = {x | u(Â; x) ¿ 0} for all t; Â. Then, by construction, s l u = Au = u for all l ∈ N and the marginal value functions induced by the stationary strategy proÿle S are given by
(1 + )u (Â; x)
so V t is a strictly positive multiple of u for all t: Hence, S t (Â) = {x | u(Â; x) ¿ 0} = {x | V t (Â; x) ¿ 0} for all t and Â: Theorem 7.1 assures that S is a maximal subgame perfect equilibrium.
The condition of the theorem above, however, is not necessary for stationary equilibria. In the following example, we are able to ÿnd two stationary equilibria: one which satisÿes the su cient condition and one which does not. As a byproduct, the example shows that there may exist multiple history independent equilibria (even multiple stationary equilibria) if the horizon is inÿnite.
Example 7.1. Consider a group = {1; 2} of agents for which the utilities u(Â; x) are given by the matrix
We assume that (Â) = 1 for both Â and t = t with = 0:3: Here, the discount factor is small enough as to ensure the existence of the marginal value functions for any strategy proÿle. Let S be the stationary strategy proÿle in which 1 always supports {1} and 2 always supports {2} at any stage and after any history. Let S be the stationary strategy proÿle in which both 1 and 2 always support {1; 2}: We show that both S and S are maximal subgame perfect equilibria.
It can be checked immediately that Au = u; so Theorem 7.2 implies that S is a maximal subgame perfect equilibrium. Now, lets l ≡s be the operator at stage l induced by S ; as used in the deÿnition of the marginal value functions above. Then, the marginal value function V t is given by
By straightforward calculations, it can be shown that V t (Â; x)¿0 for all (Â; x); and hence S t (Â) = {1; 2} = {x | V t (Â; x) ¿ 0} for all t and Â: Theorem 7.1 guarantees therefore that S is a maximal subgame perfect equilibrium. The intuition behind the equilibrium S is the following: it is in agent Â's interest to support the other agent x, since x will support Â in all remaining stages. So, by supporting x; agent Â is implicitly supporting himself.
This equilibrium would break down if the horizon would be ÿnite, since agents would only support themselves at the last stage, which makes it unattractive to support the other agent at the penultimate stage, which makes it unattractive to support the other agent at the stage before the penultimate stage and so on.
History dependent equilibria
If the agents face a ÿnite horizon, the unique maximal subgame perfect equilibrium is history independent. By means of an example, we show that an inÿnite horizon may lead to history dependent equilibria. have seen that both agents supporting only themselves is a maximal subgame perfect equilibrium, which implies that deviation is not beneÿcial for agent 1 at this stage of the game. Hence, we may conclude that S is a maximal subgame perfect equilibrium.
Concluding remarks
Our main contributions in this paper are threefold. First, we propose a general game theoretical model to study situations in which agents pertaining to a society can transfer in uence to other members by supporting them. We continue by showing that for discrete and continuum societies there is an essentially unique optimal support behavior if there is a ÿnite horizon. Here, continuum societies should be seen as approximations of large discrete societies. Moreover, we present an easy to handle recursive formula which characterizes the equilibrium. This formula is used to make qualitative statements on the support behavior of agents and to compute the equilibrium for speciÿc utility classes.
The model presented can be extended in many di erent directions. One could, for instance, consider the situation in which agents cannot support arbitrary groups of agents but face physical or ÿnancial restrictions. The model could also be extended to societies where the utilities u(Â; x); re ecting the preferences for other society members, are not ÿxed but change over time. Or one could look at situations with continuous instead of discrete time. The techniques used to derive our results can probably be adapted to continuous time in the same way as related techniques in discrete dynamic programming have been adapted to continuous programming. where the second equality is obtained by exchanging x and y.
A.2. Proof of Lemma 3.3
By induction on t − : If t = ; then we have
where the fourth equality follows from Lemma 3.2. Now, let t¿ and let the statement be true for all ¡t with t − ¡t − : Then, in particular, the statement is true for t and + 1 which means that U t (Â) = where the fourth equality follows from Lemma 3.2.
Proof of Theorem 5.1 (a) First of all, we show that the marginal value functions V t are strictly concave, anonymous and diagonally symmetric for all t: We prove the statement by induction on t.
If t = T the statement is true since V T = T u and T ¿0: Now let t¡T and let the statement be true for all ¿t: First we show anonimity of V t : Since where the third equation follows by substituting z = y −a. Hence, F is anonymous.
Next, we show diagonal symmetry of V t : Since by assumption u and V t+1 are diagonally symmetric it su ces to show that F is diagonally symmetric: By deÿnition, we have that Here, the inequality follows from the induction assumption that V t+1 (y; ·) is concave. This completes the proof of our statement.
(b) In order to prove that the special limit equilibrium S is the almost unique limit equilibrium, we show that the game satisÿes the indi erence condition and the boundedness condition. Since V t is diagonally symmetric, anonymous and strictly concave for all t we have that {x | V t (Â; x) = 0} is either empty or equal to {Â − a t ; Â + a t } for all t and Â, where a t does not depend on Â. Hence, {x | V t (Â; x) = 0} always has Lebesgue measure zero, implying that the game satisÿes the indi erence condition.
In order to prove the boundedness condition, let a¡0 be given. Since V t is diagonally symmetric, anonymous and strictly concave, we have that for all t and Â where b t does not depend on Â. So, ({x | V t (Â; x) ¿ a}) = 0 or 2b t for all t and Â: Let M = max{2b 1 ; : : : ; 2b T }: Then, ({x | V t (Â; x) ¿ a} 6 M for all t and Â and hence the boundedness condition is satisÿed.
(c) Next, we show that the limit equilibrium S is such that S t (Â) ⊂ {x | u(Â; x) ¿ 0} for all t and Â: We use induction on t.
For t = T the statement is true since S T (Â) = {x | V T (Â; x) ¿ 0} = {x | T u(Â; x) ¿ 0} = {x | u(Â; x) ¿ 0} since t ¿0: Now let t¡T: Suppose that u(Â; x)¡0: We show that V t (Â; x)¡0:
Since by assumption S t+1 (Â) = {x | V t+1 (Â; x) ¿ 0} ⊂ {x | u(Â; x) ¿ 0} it follows that V t+1 (Â; x)¡0: By deÿnition, V t (Â; x) = t u(Â; x) + V t+1 (Â; x) + y:Vt+1(x;y) ¿ 0 V t+1 (Â; y) dy:
As before, let F(Â; x) = y:Vt+1(x;y) ¿ 0 V t+1 (Â; y) dy:
Therefore it su ces to show that F(Â; x) 6 0: Since V t+1 is strictly concave, anonymous and diagonally symmetric it follows that {y | V t+1 (x; y) ¿ 0} is either empty or equal to [x − a; x + a] for some a ¿ 0.
If it is empty, then F(Â; x) = 0 by deÿnition. If a = 0 then, also, F(x) = 0: Now, suppose that a¿0: Then, where is the uniform distribution on [x − a; x + a] and E [V t+1 (Â; ·)] is the expected marginal value of V t+1 (Â; ·) with respect to . Since V t+1 (Â; ·) is concave we know by Jensen's inequality that E [V t+1 (Â; ·)] 6 V t+1 (Â; E (y)) = V t+1 (Â; x)¡0 which implies that F(x)¡0: This completes the proof of the statement.
(d) Finally, we turn to the special case where only the utility at the ÿnal stage is relevant, i.e. t = 0 for all t¡T: We show that S t (Â) ⊂ S t+1 (Â) for all t and Â:
In this special case, the marginal value functions V t are given by the recursive formula V T (Â; x) = T u(Â; x) and V t (Â; x) = V t+1 (Â; x) + y:Vt+1(x;y) ¿ 0 V t+1 (Â; y) dy = V t+1 (Â; x) + F(Â; x) if t¡T: Suppose that x = ∈ S t+1 (Â): Then, by deÿnition, V t+1 (Â; x)¡0: In the proof of the previous statement, we have seen that V t+1 (Â; x)¡0 implies F(Â; x)¡0: Hence, V t (Â; x) = V t+1 (Â; x)+F(x)¡0 which means that x = ∈ S t (Â): This completes the proof.
